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Abstract 
Nonpoint source water pollution generated by agricultural produc- 
tion is considered a major environmental issue in the United States 
and Europe. One strategy in the United States has been to adopt var- 
ious measures, called best management practices (BMPs), to reduce 
water pollution. Our research addresses legal institutions and the ap- 
plied use of BMPs, and discusses compensatory payments o reduce 
nitrogen fertilization levels. Models employed in Georgia and 
Baden-Wuerttemberg valuate institutional constraints of payments 
to reduce nitrogen usage, penalties for excessive l aching, and fi- 
nancial incentives for meeting minimum mineralized nitrogen lev- 
els. By modeling net returns, preferred economic strategies for pro- 
ducers are identified. Results show that while BMPs can reduce 
agricultural nonpoint contamination, pollution abatement may be 
costly to producers. Thus, reduced pollution probably will require 
some type of government intervention. 
1. Introduction 
In developing strategies for the optimal use of the resources 
of the Baltic Sea, consideration must be given to nonpoint 
source water pollution generated by agricultural production. 
While various changes in the agricultural resources and pro- 
duction of the Baltic region make it difficult to discern the 
amount of pollution generated by this sector of the economy, 
it is well documented that animal production and the heavy 
use of fertilizers on agricultural crops produces excess nitro- 
gen that moves into the waters of the Baltic Sea. Our paper 
addresses the issue of agricultural water contamination and 
strategies that might be employed to reduce the amount of 
nutrient pollution by agricultural facilities. 
Pollution of water by agriculture may be categorized into 
three major groupings: erosion, nutrients, and pesticides. A1- 
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though these groupings are distinct and may present different 
problems, each pollution issue contributes to the public's 
concern of water quality. One approach as been to adopt var- 
ious measures to reduce water pollution, and best manage- 
ment practices (BMPs) have received considerable attention 
in the United States (U.S.). BMPs generally refer to practices 
determined to be the most effective practical means for pre- 
venting or reducing the amount of pollution generated by 
nonpoint sources to a level compatible with quality goals 
(CENTNER et al.). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) defines a BMP as "[m]ethods, measures or practices 
selected by an agency to meet its nonpoint source control 
needs" (Code of Federal Regulations 1994). BMPs include 
structural and nonstructural controls and operation and main- 
tenance procedures. BMPs can be applied before, during and 
after pollution-producing activities to reduce or eliminate the 
introduction of pollutants into receiving waters. In theory, 
BMPs minimize water pollution through the application of 
conservation principles that are ecologically sound. 
This article addresses research in the United States and 
Germany concerning the use of BMPs, with an emphasis on 
nitrate pollution. Section two identifies the legal institutions 
of the United States which directly relate to BMPs. In the 
third section, BMPs prescribed for use in the state of Georgia 
are described. Next, the economics of management practices 
and incentives in controlling agricultural water pollution are 
discussed. The fifth and sixth sections ummarize findings 
from a pilot project conducted in Georgia nd a collaborative 
research study in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany, that were 
aimed at reducing nitrate pollution. The final section summa- 
rizes findings of the paper and presents conclusions and im- 
plications on agricultural water quality policies. 
2. U.S. Legal Institutions 
Several major legal institutions in the United States consist- 
ing of laws, regulations and recommendations provide for 
the use of BMPs to reduce pollution. The Clean Water Act 
articulates federal requirements for nonpoint source manage- 
ment programs to attain or maintain applicable water quality 
standards for navigable waters (United States Code 1988). 
Reports by each American state identify significant nonpoint 
sources of pollution that denigrate applicable water quality 
standards or the goals of the Act (United States Code 1988). 
States have developed processes for identifying BMPs and 
measures to control nonpoint sources of pollution, and they 
have identified state and local programs for controlling pol- 
lution emanating from nonpoint sources (United States Code 
1988). The federal government appropriated funds for pro- 
jects to control nonpoint source pollution (United States 
Code 1993) but did not mandate the use of BMPs in the 
Clean Water Act. 
States have adopted nonpoint source management plans 
pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act. Georgia adopted its 
plan in December, 1989, and the Georgia Soil and Water 
Conservation Commission (Commission) was designated as 
the administering agency for the management of agricultural 
nonpoint sources of pollution (Environmental Protection Di- 
vision 1989). The Commission conducted a statewide pro- 
gram to encourage the voluntary adoption of BMPs and re- 
ported its findings and a list of BMPs. The subsequent publi- 
cation of updated findings and recommendations occurred in 
1994 (Georgia Soil & Water Conservation Commission 
1994). Further state legislation delineates additional infor- 
mation on BMPs (Georgia Code Annotated 1994; Georgia 
Compilation of Rules & Regulations 1992). 
Other provisions impact he use of management practices 
to reduce agricultural pollution. Because regulations of the 
Clean Water Act classify concentrated animal feeding opera- 
tions as point sources of pollution (United States Code 
1988), these operations are governed by other provisions. 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(United States Code 1994) governs pesticides, and various 
regulations impact the use of pesticides that pollute water 
(Code of Federal Regulations 1994). The Safe Drinking 
Water Act established maximum contaminant levels for vari- 
ous contaminants, and states were required to develop well- 
head protection programs (United States Code 1988). The 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 directed coastal 
states to submit a program with management measures for 
nonpoint source pollution (United States Code 1993). Man- 
agement measures under the Coastal Zone Management Act 
differed from BMPs and are intended to include only eco- 
nomically achievable measures. 
Individual state tort law also may be used to address 
groundwater pollution problems. New regulations concern- 
ing liability for pesticide pollution have been adopted in 
some states (Georgia Code Annotated 1994; Iowa Code An- 
notated 1993; Vermont Statutes Annotated 1995). The signif- 
icance of this legislation is that if agricultural producers have 
not done anything wrong in their use of registered pesticides 
for agricultural production, then they should not be liable for 
damages when the pesticides enter groundwater and cause 
pollution injuries (CENTNER & WETZSTEIN 1992). 
3. Pollution Reduction through Best 
Management Practices 
Research pursuant o the Clean Water Act has guided the 
identification of BMPs to reduce water pollution from agri- 
cultural and other land-disturbing activities. Current re- 
search continues to suggest new and improved practices that 
assist in nonpoint source pollution abatement. This section 
highlights 14 different agricultural BMPs which have been 
prescribed for protecting water quality in Georgia. Each of 
these practices is presented under the primary pollution 
problem that each addresses: erosion, pesticides, and nutri- 
ents. 
Although BMPs may be beneficial in reducing nutrient 
and pesticide pollution, a majority primarily address erosion. 
BMPs for erosion include: (a) cover crops, (b) contour farm- 
ing and terracing, (c) conservation tillage, (d) streamside 
vegetative buffers, (e) filter strips and waterways, (f) pasture 
management, (g) stripcropping, and (h) stream and water- 
body protection (Georgia Soil & Water Conservation Com- 
mission 1994). Secondary applications of many of these 
BMPs to one or more other sources of pollution is likely in a 
systems approach to mitigating water quality impacts. Cover 
crops of grasses, legumes or small grains are planted to pro- 
tect or improve the soil. The benefits often involve a vegeta- 
tive cover to preclude soil erosion in the absence of the main 
crop and the incorporation of their residues into the soil. 
Cover crops may be especially important after a low-residue 
producing crop, such as soybeans or corn cut for silage. 
As a BMP, contour farming and terracing are grouped to- 
gether. Contour farming across the slope on or near the level, 
as opposed to up and down the slope, is most suitable on uni- 
formly sloping fields. Terraces are earthen embankments 
constructed on the contour or across a slope to intercept 
runoff. Expensive to construct, terraces cannot be used on 
sandy, stony, or shallow soils (Georgia Soil & Water Conser- 
vation Commission 1994). 
No-till and conservation tillage has gained acceptance as 
a major agricultural practice to reduce soil erosion and to 
conserve moisture. Conservation tillage may be defined as a 
tillage method for planting that leaves at least 30% of the soil 
surface covered with crop residue (Georgia Soil & Water 
Conservation Commission 1994). Adoption of this practice 
often requires an increase in the use of herbicides. 
Trees, woody shrubs, and other vegetation can be planted 
or maintained adjacent to and upgradient from streams and 
water bodies as vegetative buffers. The streamside vegeta- 
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tion provides anatural filter for sediment and organic materi- 
al and their attached nutrients, pesticides and other pollu- 
tants. 
In areas where it may be expected there will be a shallow 
and uniform flow of water over a broad surface, filter strips 
of grass may be used to remove sediment or other pollutants 
from the runoff. Strips are often about 8 m in width, and 
grading is usually needed to create a broad area for the uni- 
form flow of water (Georgia Soil & Water Conservation 
Commission 1994). Similarly, grassed waterways are perma- 
nent drainage ways of perennial grasses to protect soils from 
erosion by concentrated water flows. If livestock are allowed 
to graze these areas, they must be limited to periods when 
soil moisture is low enough to preclude compaction, bog- 
ging, or the destruction of the vegetation. Ongoing research 
seeks to determine whether grass buffer strips may cleanse 
wastes applied via overland flow. 
Pasture management involves the selection of plant 
species, stocking rates, nutrient application, control of 
weeds, and grazing management (Georgia Soil & Water 
Conservation Commission 1994). Appropriate planning and 
implementation f stream and water body protection policies 
may be important in protecting and enhancing the quality of 
water, due to potential erosion and pollution caused by live- 
stock. This may include the exclusion of livestock from 
streams or bodies of water and preventive measures to keep 
pesticides, fertilizers, animal manures, and other pollutants 
out of water. For some areas, seed may be drilled or cast to 
augment existing pastures. 
Stripcropping involves the planting of a strip of a sod or 
close-growing crop with an alternate strip of a row crop. Ero- 
sion may be reduced, and the use of rotating crops on the 
strips may reduce the amount of pesticides needed through 
this practice (Georgia Soil & Water Conservation Commis- 
sion 1994). 
Practices and preventive measures, uch as fencing cattle 
out of streams, the construction of culverts, the development 
of sediment basins, or the creation of alternative water 
sources for livestock form another BMR Agro-forestry prac- 
tices to reduce nutrient mobility and to deter pollutants and 
sediment from entering streams and water bodies, such as fil- 
ter strips, grassed waterways, and streamside vegetative 
buffers, also are BMPs that protect water bodies. 
Reduction of pesticides may occur through the adoption 
of pest management programs or crop rotation. One of the 
most celebrated evelopments in pesticide pollution abate- 
ment has been the development of integrated pest manage- 
ment programs. Through practices and strategies, uch as the 
use of field scouting and data collection and analysis, pesti- 
cides are only applied at critical times of need. This BMP 
thereby lessens the quantities of pesticides used. Research on 
farm management systems and pest management informa- 
tion may lead to a substantial reduction in the pollution from 
pesticides. Practices involving chemical mixing sites and 
rinse pads, as well as careful container disposal, may also 
form pest management BMPs that are important in reducing 
pesticide contamination. 
Crop rotation through aplanned sequence of changing the 
crop grown on a particular field enables producers to control 
some pests, diseases, and weeds without he use of pesticides 
(Georgia Soil & Water Conservation Commission 1994). 
Rotation may also create different ypes of residues and bet- 
ter soil quality. For example, a legume may enhance soil ni- 
trogen for a subsequent crop. 
BMPs to reduce pollution from nutrients are (a) nutrient 
management, (b) irrigation water management, (c) agricul- 
tural waste management systems, and (d) composting. The 
two nutrients that are most often associated with agricultural 
nutrient pollution are nitrogen and phosphorus. Research 
concerning amounts, sources, forms, placement, and timing 
of nutrient applications has enabled agricultural producers to 
engage in application management to control nutrient pollu- 
tion. 
Nutrient pollution may also be reduced ue to improved 
irrigation water management. By controlling the rate, timing, 
and amount of irrigation water, producers are able to reduce 
the leaching of nutrients (Georgia Soil & Water Conserva- 
tion Commission 1994). Technology, such as check valves 
and anti-syphon devices, may be used to prevent well pollu- 
tion when fertigation (the application of fertilizer with irriga- 
tion) or chemigation (the application of pesticides or chemi- 
cals with irrigation) is used. 
Facilities and procedures used to temporarily store ma- 
nure and other waste products for timely application to agri- 
cultural and comprise the BMP of agricultural waste man- 
agement systems (Georgia Soil & Water Conservation Com- 
mission 1994). Liquid manure stored in lagoons and slurry 
manure in waste storage structures are major components of 
animal production waste management systems. Facility de- 
sign, procedures, and application of agricultural wastes is 
also part of this BMR 
Livestock facilities with organic wastes, such as animal 
manures and dead poultry, may need to adopt a composting 
process. The process may stabilize the organic matter, reduce 
odors, preserve nutrients, and prepare the matter for handling 
or spreading. Composting, with land application at an appro- 
priate time, allows wastes to be utilized on-farm as a soil 
amendment and a nutrient source of nitrogen (Georgia Soil 
& Water Conservation Commission 1994). 
4. Adoption of BMPs in the United States 
The literature on controlling water pollution from agricultur- 
al practices takes the non-point nature of this pollution as its 
element of departure from other literature on pollution con- 
trol and instrument choice. It is generally accepted that soil 
loss, nutrient loadings, or pesticide and other chemical dis- 
charges into surface and ground water can not be accurately 
and consistently measured from any individual farm. This 
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puts available regulatory instruments into the second-best 
category right from the beginning, since price and quantity 
instruments based on environmental damage are unavail- 
able. Other possibilities include taxes or regulation on agri- 
cultural output and the use of legal liability. The scope for 
each of these is severely limited as a management tool, al- 
though reduction of output subsidies could have strong posi- 
tive effects (ABLER & SHORTLE 1993). Liability could prove 
useful in the case of large, unique polluters (like some live- 
stock operations), but will be unworkable in any multiple- 
polluter case and will carry significant transactions costs in 
any case. 
GRIFFEN & BROMLEY (1982) demonstrated that with 
enough information and inter-farm differentiation, the exact 
same (first-best) results could be achieved by using price 
(management incentives) or quantity (management prac- 
tices) instruments on production inputs and methods as by 
using (infeasible) pollution taxes or quantity instruments. 
Their message was not that all four were equally good choic- 
es, but that measurement problems, uncertainty, policy trans- 
actions costs, and other institutional phenomena would dic- 
tate the appropriate choice in a given situation. SHORTLE & 
DUNY (1986) extended their analysis to argue that given in- 
formation structure of agricultural regulation, management 
incentives were more likely to be effective (efficient) be- 
cause they provide incentives for farmers to make better use 
of their information advantage over regulators in choosing 
abatement activities. 
The functional difference between management i centives 
and practices is that the former involve putting a price (either 
a tax or a subsidy) on marginal levels of that practice with ul- 
timate decisions left to the farmer, while the latter involve 
mandated limits on input quantities or call for certain levels 
of particular practices. In theory, management practices and 
incentives are duals and the same result can be achieved with 
either. Again, measurement problems, uncertainty, policy 
transactions costs, and other institutional phenomena would 
dictate the appropriate choice in a given situation. 
Our observation and reading of the literature have led us 
to believe that problems of monitoring and institutional limi- 
tations lead to a relatively clear choice between incentives 
and practices. Inputs which directly affect the production 
function and are continuous in nature will be best regulated 
through incentives; in particular, through taxes. Fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides are continuous choice variables in 
agricultural production functions. States have the legal au- 
thority to tax these products, and administratively it is not 
difficult to collect such a tax at the point of wholesale distri- 
bution. For example, Iowa has a $0.75 per ton tax on nitro- 
gen fertilizer (CAST 1992). GRIFFEN & BRONLEY make clear 
that to be optimal, management incentives must be differen- 
tiated by producer. While the taxes themselves are feasible, it 
is both administratively and politically impossible to differ- 
entiate input taxes among differently situated farmers in a 
given state; taxes will be equal for all farmers. 
In contrast, management practices defined over quantities 
of these inputs are unlikely. As BRADEN & SEGERSON (1993) 
note, the timing and care taken in application have conse- 
quences for pollutant loadings independent of the quantity of 
the input used. Although the EPA can ban a chemical input 
outright, mandating any particular quantitative limit of fertil- 
izer use or any non-zero maximum level of pesticides or her- 
bicides is difficult to do administratively and almost impos- 
sible to observe and enforce in practice. 
However, there are a variety of management practices 
which work by diminishing pollutant loadings from any 
given level of input application. Forest strips, vegetative 
buffer zones, and constructed wetlands all filter out or other- 
wise diminish the pollutant loadings entering surface water 
produced by any given quantity of inputs. To a reasonable 
approximation, these practices do not enter directly into the 
production function except in terms of displacing land from 
production. The use of incentives in the sense used in the lit- 
erature does not really apply to these practices. Since they do 
not enter into the production function, farmers have no rea- 
son to engage in these practices unless they are required to 
do so, or unless they are compensated. 
Pilot cost-sharing programs attempted over the past 
decade have been voluntary and do not fully compensate for 
the full cost of the management practices. If farmers were 
taxed a unit amount for not constructing the practice in ques- 
tion, this could be interpreted as an incentive. However, it is 
functionally equivalent to a regulation with a penalty. Regu- 
latory authority to require this type of intervention is current- 
ly quite limited. Farmers who fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Coastal Zone Management Act can be required to formu- 
late management plans. Authorities also have cost-share 
funds available to partially compensate he expense of the in- 
terventions under pilot programs. 
The Conservation Reserve Program also applies to some 
limited degree. In theory, interventions under this program 
are continuous; i.e., wider filter strips and buffer zones, larg- 
er treatment lagoons and constructed wetlands should pro- 
vide increasing levels of protection against nutrient and pes- 
ticide loading of aquatic environments. In practice, state 
guidelines for instituting management practices tend to spec- 
ify a particular level of management practices; for example, 
a 16 m wide filter strip. Practices will be instituted as part of 
a formal or informal contract (i.e., a nutrient or chemical 
management plan) and can therefore be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Different kinds or degrees of interventions, or no inter- 
ventions, can be negotiated or mandated for different farms, 
depending on the topographic and soil characteristics of the 
lands, the nature of farming practices, the health of the wa- 
tershed, and the number of other pollution sources contribut- 
ing to any problems. Such individual tailoring requires farm- 
level participation by regulators, and current manpower re- 
sources are inadequate to do this for anything like the entire 
population of farmers. In addition, legislative and regulatory 
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authority to date has been unclear or evolving, and farmers 
can not be absolutely required to construct these solutions. It 
does seem likely that in the wake of the new Clean Water Act 
amendments there will be substantially increased authority. 
One implication of the difference between the available 
incentive policies and those instituted as management prac- 
tices is a reversal of the interfirm efficiency properties of 
taxes and standards. Management incentives in the form of 
input taxes lose the automatic least cost property of taxes for 
two reasons. First, they are taxes on inputs which are imper- 
fectly correlated with the output of pollution. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, they will be constrained to be 
identical across watersheds and across farms with different 
pollution targets. Standards at least potentially possess the 
ability to improve efficiency be treating different farms dif- 
ferently, although information and administrative costs and 
current regulatory institutions make this difficult and expen- 
sive. It has been widely recognized how important inter-farm 
differentiation is for agricultural regulation. An excellent 
demonstration is given in the work of TAYLOR et al. (1992), 
who analyzed a variety of policies for Willamette Valley 
farms and found that optimal policies were required to be 
quite different across farm location and type. 
It is clear from the regulation of point sources of pollu- 
tion, however, that passing regulations and achieving them 
are very different phenomena. Individual farmers and agri- 
cultural obbies have a variety of legal and political means of 
seeking exemptions, delays, and cheaper solutions. Outright 
evasion is possible as well (MALIK et al. 1993). Reports of 
farm focus groups indicate that, except in cases where activi- 
ties are directly profit-enhancing, in the absence of clear reg- 
ulatory authority the only motivation farmers have for reduc- 
ing pollution is the hope of avoiding increased future regula- 
tion. In any regulatory environment, management practices 
are more likely to be adopted when the cost to farms is re- 
duced. However, large-scale subsidy programs are unlikely 
given national budget priorities and traditional attitudes to- 
ward the financing of pollution reduction. One possibility is 
to use the revenue from incentive policies (input taxes) to fi- 
nance other pollution abatement activities (management 
practices). 
The wide variety of BMPs available for adoption in Geor- 
gia highlights the major challenge of this approach. The ef- 
fectiveness of each practice in reducing nonpoint source pol- 
lution depends on crop choice, soil and topography charac- 
teristics, and hydrological and loading characteristics of the  
watershed. Farmers will tend to adopt whichever BMPs are 
least costly or unfamiliar; there is no guarantee that this 
choice will be the most cost-effective in reducing pollution 
to an acceptable l vel. The research reported here helps to 
clarify the relationship between individual practices and pol- 
lution reduction as a function of timing and crop choice. It is 
necessary to note, however, that even if the challenge of de- 
termining which BMPs should be used can be met, both 
American and German institutions face a substantial chal- 
lenge in providing the flexibility and the authority to imple- 
ment a pattern of BMPs which is both economically efficient 
and ecologically effective. 
5. A Georgia Demonstration Project 
The Gum Creek Watershed, located in the U.S. Coastal Plain 
of Georgia, was identified as a stream likely to be threatened 
by agricultural nonpoint source pollution and, subsequently, 
was selected as a water quality demonstration project. This 
watershed has a gentle relief, warm and humid weather, and 
fertile soil. Such factors favor intensive agricultural produc- 
tion of diverse crops, including peanuts and corn (maize). 
Soils with high or intermediate pesticide and nutrient leach- 
ing pollution potential cover most of the upland areas of the 
watershed. Several sub-watersheds have more than 50% of 
their surface area planted to crops that have high fertilizer 
and pesticide requirements. 
As part of a federal cost-sharing pilot program, the 
demonstration project sought to reduce potential nonpoint 
source pollution by inducing farmers to voluntarily adopt 
BMPs (Georgia Cooperative Extension Service 1992). The 
restriction of pollution levels, or abatement from current 
practices, would be compensated partially by government 
lump-sum subsidies to farmers, assumed to be a sharing of 
the farmer's reduction of net returns (opportunity costs) by 
adopting the new BMP rather than the current management 
practice. An economic study evaluated the potential for vol- 
untary adoption of BMP alternatives through adoption as- 
sessment, biophysical simulation, and mathematical pro- 
gramming under uncertain weather and market conditions 
(SuN 1994). Farmers' willingness to cost-share was used to 
estimate xpectations ofnet returns and associated water and 
soil pollution based upon government cost-share scenarios. 
To examine voluntary participation i centives, a watershed 
survey included willingness-to-accept payment questions in 
order to enumerate farmers' adoption probabilities for 4 gov- 
ernment cost-share rates - 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% (with 
zero and 100% levels implicitly restricted). 
Pollution control targets did not exist for comparison with 
the simulated soil and nitrogen pollution outputs. Thus, soil 
losses and nitrogen emission levels were restricted to levels 
less than or equal to the pollution levels corresponding to a 
management alternative with 122.7 kg/ha of nitrogen and a 
50% water availability trigger. Economic modeling assumed 
maximization of farmers' expected net returns when agricul- 
tural source pollution is restricted under current production 
technology. Three locally-validated, biophysical simulators 
were linked to obtain crop yields and pollution output. 
PEANUTGRO version 1.02 (BOOTE et al. 1989), a process- 
oriented peanut crop growth model, was used to simulate 
peanut crop development, water and nitrogen balance, and 
peanut yield. CERES-Maize version 2.10 (RITCHm et al. 
1992) simulated the growth and yield of a peanuts-corn ota- 
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tion. GLEAMS (Groundwater Loading Effects on Agricul- 
tural Management Systems) version 2.0 (KNISEL et al. 1992) 
simulated the physical movement of agricultural chemicals 
within and through the plant root zone. The GLEAMS model 
also generated the chemical pollution and soil erosion output 
levels, given crop growth parameters, agricultural manage- 
ment systems, and other physical data. Crop yields and nutri- 
ent flows to ground and surface water were simulated over 
17 years of local weather data and site-specific haracteris- 
tics of the watershed. Employing corresponding market-year 
price data, net returns were calculated. Further, the potential 
pollution effects, combined with the farmers' probable adop- 
tion of cost-sharing, were used to generate annual expecta- 
tions of net returns and potential emission levels. 
Supplemental irrigation was shown to increase farmers' 
average expected net returns greatly, while resultant soil 
losses would remain essentially constant. Nitrogen runoff 
would increase up to 5%, but nitrogen leaching could in- 
crease by as much as 14%. If the resultant effects were less 
than or equal to watershed area targets et for nonpoint pollu- 
tion by the EPA, the profitability of supplemental irrigation 
option is substantial. Nitrogen leaching actually declines 
slightly at the lower supplemental irrigation rates before in- 
creasing at higher, more profitable irrigation rates. Without 
irrigation, nitrogen leaching could be reduced more than 
18% by applying no nitrogen fertilizer. Given the current 
cropping mix, agricultural sources of potential water quality 
degradation or enhancement could thus be altered within a 
limited range of responses. 
Over a range of management alternatives, results indicat- 
ed that irrigation and nitrogen fertilizer applications do not 
alter water quality in the watershed as much as generally an- 
ticipated. Under limited government payments, pollution 
abatement through reduction of irrigation and/or nitrogen 
fertilizer applications may significantly reduce farmers' net 
revenues and hence, without threats of other regulatory 
means, more farmers may opt out of a voluntary program. 
Further abatement of nitrogen leaching should consider 
other cropping management alternatives or emphasize non- 
agricultural sources. Optimization results at varying cost- 
share subsidies howed that nitrogen leaching could be ex- 
pected to be reduced by up to 10% from baseline results in 
the scenarios tested. Soil losses and nitrogen runoff were 
quite inflexible with respect to abatement potential. 
6. Baden-Wuerttemberg Study 
The conditions for agricultural production in water-protected 
areas of Germany include proper production techniques and 
other limitations. Proper production techniques entail the 
suitable use of the area according to its natural features 
through practices including varied broad rotations, cover 
crops, soil conservation practices, nitrogen fertilization ac- 
cording to the nitrogen uptake of the plants, and the use of 
pesticides under principles of an integrated plant protection 
plan. Additional imitations required to justify the compensa- 
tion payments include the reduction of nitrogen fertilization 
by 20%, the confined use of manure application, cover crops, 
and use of selected pesticides. For nearly 25% of the fields in 
the water protected areas, the nitrate amount in the soil is 
controlled in the fall. If more than 45 kg of nitrate-nitrogen is 
present in the top 90 cm of soil, it is suspected that the guide- 
lines have been broken. These regulations erve a similar ob- 
jective as BMPs in the United States. 
A research project in Baden-Wuerttemberg evaluated 
tradeoffs between the use of BMPs to reduce water pollution 
and farmers' incomes. An ecological-economic model was 
used for simulation and optimization of agricultural produc- 
tion strategies for decreasing the erosion and high nitrate con- 
tent. The CREAMS (Chemicals, Runoff and Erosion from 
Agricultural Management Systems) (KN~sEL 1980) soil simu- 
lation model was used to determine the ecological impact of 
management practices to the environment. An economic 
model was employed to maximize the profit function over 
two crop rotations: (1) sugar beets-winter wheat-corn-win- 
ter wheat; and (2) sugar beets-winter wheat-winter barley. 
The model was selected to demonstrate how to fertilize each 
crop over a time horizon of 20 years and how best to split the 
fertilizer over the growing season. The factors examined 
were the integrative medium of inputs, turnover, and outputs. 
Inputs for the model consisted of climatic data, land use, cul- 
tural practices, fertilization, and pesticide usage. Outputs of 
nutrients and pesticides occurred through evapotranspiration, 
surface runoff, soil erosion, and leaching. Field data consist- 
ed of inputs, prices, costs, and sugar beet quotas. 
The desired output was nitrogen uptake, as uptake deter- 
mined yields and avoided excessive nitrogen mineralization 
in the fall. A governmental premium of 310 DM/ha is lost if 
mineralized nitrogen exceeds 45 kg/ha in the fall. An opti- 
mizing algorithm, COMPLEX (Box 1965), as further devel- 
oped by MANETSCtt (1989), was used to maximize the func- 
tion. The economic model initially chose the nitrogen fertil- 
ization level, which was the input variable for CREAMS. 
Extensive soil erosion and nitrogen losses may create 
problems for surface and groundwater in the intensively cul- 
tivated loess hillslope countrysides of the Kraichgau. Mini- 
mal soil coverage from May until June leads to greater soil 
erosion. Soil erosion was reduced in the first rotation (sugar 
beets-winter wheat-corn-winter wheat). The average soil 
erosion was 30 t/ha/yr with sugar beets, 23 t/ha/yr with corn, 
and 9 t/ha/yr with winter wheat. In conventional cultivation, 
soil erosion exceeded the tolerable values. Under conserva- 
tion systems, soil erosion was reduced through one or more 
practices, including track loosening in corn (whereby equip- 
ment behind tractor tires breaks up and loosens the soil), 
grass strips in the middle of slopes, or a diversion ditch for 
runoff water. Therefore, these management practices pro- 
vided minor protection against excessive soil erosion. A no- 
till practice or the planting of an intercrop of mustard after 
Limnologica 29 (1999) 3 371 
sugar beets or corn were shown to be the most effective 
system. 
Employing a second crop rotation of sugar beets-winter 
wheat-and winter barley, soil erosion tended to be deter- 
mined by single events. In years that sugar beets were pro- 
duced, higher soil erosion occurred. The same rotation with 
an intercrop of mustard after winter barley reduced soil ero- 
sion to about 1 t/ha/yr. 
The model showed less nitrogen fertilizer being needed to 
achieve a maximum income for a producer when compen- 
satory payments for ecological constraints were available. 
Also, significant amounts of nitrogen remaining in the soil 
after plantings of winter wheat or winter barley were present. 
Since the use of an intercrop was able to reduce nitrogen in 
the autumn significantly, the model used an intercrop of 
mustard after winter wheat during the first rotation and after 
winter barley during the second rotation. The analysis also 
showed that use of a considerable amount of nitrogen fertil- 
izer in spring increased yields and profits without substantial 
ecological impacts. However, low compensatory payments 
to reduce nitrogen fertilization levels could provide signifi- 
cant ecological benefits. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
BMPs may be implemented by agricultural producers to re- 
duce nonpoint source agricultural pollution, but may not be 
implemented absent adequate incentive. An interdisciplinary 
approach is necessary to develop accurate measurements of 
pollutants, models to identify and monitor negative pollution 
effects, and consideration of various strategies to maximize 
net returns to producers within the constraints of targeted 
water quality standards. As shown in the reported projects 
from Georgia and Baden-Wuerttemberg, models evaluating 
institutional constraints of payments to reduce nitrogen 
usage, penalties for excessive leaching, or financial incen- 
tives for meeting minimum mineralized nitrogen levels may 
identify preferred policies. 
A project in Georgia used an economic framework to ana- 
lyze farmers' voluntary adoption of water quality manage- 
ment alternatives within a government cost-share project. 
Supplemental irrigation management appeared to offer op- 
portunities to increase farmers' expected net revenues with 
little impact on soil and nitrogen runoff. However, the costs 
of agricultural pollution abatement by reducing irrigation 
and/or nitrogen fertilizer application rates were significant. 
Consideration of other management alternatives, uch as re- 
stricting the cropland for peanuts in the rotation, may lead to 
further abatement of nitrogen leaching. As pollution abate- 
ment significantly reduced farmers' net revenues, it is un- 
likely that producers voluntarily will adopt measures to re- 
duce nitrogen or other chemical pollution. 
A project in Baden-Wuerttemberg analyzed soil erosion 
and fertilization for the development of optimal nitrogen fer- 
tilization strategies. Intercropping was shown to substantial- 
ly reduce soil erosion and nitrate leaching; thus the model 
showed considerable potential for reducing agricultural pol- 
lution. Optimal timing and reduced fertilization would allow 
increased profits because of compensation payments provid- 
ed by the government. 
Although BMPs can reduce agricultural nonpoint pollu- 
tion, pollution reduction may be costly to producers. There- 
fore, reduced pollution probably will require some type of 
government intervention. One approach is to prescribe 
BMPs or proscribe practices and activities that create xces- 
sive pollution through regulatory institutions. Another ap- 
proach is to establish pollution thresholds, with penalties for 
exceeding the threshold or incentives to meet the threshold. 
While the reduction of agricultural pollution generally re- 
mains voluntary in the United States, there has been a will- 
ingness to reduce pollution by nitrogen through compensato- 
ry payments in the European Union. Further research may 
disclose more appropriate strategies to reduce pollution 
while preserving producer incomes. 
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